Enterprises in transition: macroeconomic influences on enterprise decision-making and performance by Buiter, Willem H. et al.
CENTRE
for
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 340
March 1997
ENTERPRISES IN TRANSITION:
MACROECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON ENTERPRISE
DECISION-MAKING AND PERFORMANCE
W. Buiter, R. Lago and H. Rey
ABSTRACT
The paper analyses the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
linking enterprise performance in transition economies to the
macroeconomic environment.  Macroeconomic instability is traced
to the unsustainability of the fiscal-financial and monetary
programmes of the state and to regulatory and other failures leading
to problems with the solvency of financial institutions.  The
importance of macroeconomic stability for enterprise performance is
documented with a simulation study and by reviewing relevant
microeconomic and aggregate empirical evidence from across the
world, as well as from the transition economies themselves.
Conclusions are reached about the speed of transition, about the
synergy between macroeconomic stabilisation and market
development and about the creation of institutions for achieving and
maintaining macroeconomic stability.
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s
International Economic Performance Programme
Published by
Centre for Economic Performance
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London  WC2A 2AE
© W. Buiter, R. Lago and H. Rey
ISBN 0 85328 296 X
ENTERPRISES IN TRANSITION:
MACROECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON ENTERPRISE
DECISION-MAKING AND PERFORMANCE
W. Buiter, R. Lago and H. Rey
MARCH 1997
ENTERPRISES IN TRANSITION:
MACROECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON ENTERPRISE
DECISION-MAKING AND PERFORMANCE
W. Buiter, R. Lago and H. Rey
                Page
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW    1
II. SOURCES OF MACROECONOMIC INSTABILITY    4
A. Solvency of the State     4
B. Solvency of Financial Institutions    7
III. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AS A DETERMINANT OF ENTERPRISE
DECISION MAKING AND PERFORMANCE  12
A. Sources of Differential Enterprise Performance  12
B. Macroeconomic Distortions  16
C. Distributional Aspects of Inflation  20
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF THE
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ON ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE
A. Simulations of the Financial Performance of Three Stylised  21
     Projects Across Several Countries in Transition: Introduction  21
B. Returns on Investments  26
B.1. Greenfield Investments  26
B.2. Investments in Existing Assets  31
C. The Implications  37
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF THE
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ON INVESTMENT AND GROWTH  39
A. Evidence from Aggregate Data for the Economies in Transition  39
B. Global Evidence on the Relation Between Inflation, Investment
and Growth  43
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS  45
A. Speed of Transition  45
B. Synergy Between Macrostabilisation and Market Development  45
C. Establishing the Institutions for Macroeconomic Stability  47
ENDNOTES  50
REFERENCES  55
The Centre for Economic Performance is funded by the Economic
and Social Research Council.  Financial support from the
CEP/Economist Forum is gratefully acknowledged.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The views expressed here are those of the authors only and do not
necessarily represent those of the EBRD.  Sections of the paper draw
on ‘Enterprise Performance and Macroeconomic Control’ by Buiter,
Lago and Stern (1997) and ‘A Portfolio Approach to a Cross-
Sectoral and Cross-National Investment Strategy in Transition
Economies’, by Buiter, Lago and Rey (1997).  M. Guitian and C.
Demizer made useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Willem Buiter is at the Centre for Economic Performance, London
School of Economics and Professor of International
Macroeconomics at the University of Cambridge.
Ricardo Lago is Deputy Chief Economist at the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
Hélène Rey is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Economic
Performance, London School of Economics.
ENTERPRISES IN TRANSITION:
 MACROECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON ENTERPRISE
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W. Buiter, R. Lago and H. Rey
I.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The main theme of this paper is that macroeconomic stability is a
critical precondition for effective enterprise decision making and
performance.  It is a classic pure public (intermediate) good, both
non-rival1 and non-excludable2.  Macroeconomic stability boosts
the quantity and quality of investment. In turn, productive
investment is one of the key determinants of economic growth and
rising living standards.  Since the government has a monopoly over
the instruments of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy and sets
the legal and regulatory framework within which economic activity
takes place, the provision of macroeconomic stability is a natural
responsibility of the government.
There are at least two angles from which one can analyse the
effects of macroeconomic instability on enterprise performance. The
first concerns economy-wide (and sometimes international or global)
systemic failure: the Great Depression of the Thirties and the
collapse of central planning across Central and Eastern Europe
(henceforth CEEC) and the Former Soviet Union (henceforth FSU)
and the subsequent trade and payments disruption constitute prime
examples.
The second angle concerns the impact on enterprise
performance of a domestic fiscal-financial-monetary policy
programme that, at best, is inconsistent with achieving and/or
maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation and, at worst, is
completely unsustainable.  Macroeconomic instability often
manifests itself through outright inflationary financing or else
through a rising public debt-GDP ratio that is not matched by a
rising capacity for generating future primary (non-interest)
2government budget surpluses.  There is a growing body of empirical
evidence (and some recent theoretical research) on the existence of a
close link between extreme macroeconomic instability and economic
growth (see e.g. Fischer (1991, 1993), Barro (1995), Easterly (1996)
and Bruno and Easterly (1996)).
In the CEEC and FSU, the swift and wide-ranging price
liberalisation measures with which transition was started and the
initial monetary overhang inherited from the central planning era
caused a large price level shock, recorded in the data as a
(temporary) big spike in the rate of inflation.  Effective
macroeconomic management could have prevented this temporary
inflationary surge from being transformed into a sustained increase in
the rate of inflation.  Some countries, like the former
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were indeed able, through
restrictive macroeconomic policies, to prevent what was,
fundamentally, a one-off shock to the general price level, from
turning into a process of ongoing high inflation.  Others were less
successful and perpetuated high inflation through their governments’
ineffectiveness in controlling the fiscal and monetary accounts.  Of
course, initial conditions varied widely across countries and
influenced subsequent developments.3
High inflation, at times even hyperinflation, results when the
domestic and international financial markets become unwilling to
absorb non-monetary debt in quantities sufficient to finance the
public sector’s budget deficit.  This unwillingness manifests itself
through very high real rates of interest on the public debt, shortening
maturities and, ultimately, through credit rationing.  At that point,
the only means through which the government can finance the
excess of its financial deficit over the amount it is able to borrow, is
domestic credit expansion, that is, monetary financing or seigniorage.
Sooner or later, sustained increases in the rate of monetary growth
lead to higher inflation: excessive recourse to seigniorage causes a
rising inflation tax rate.  Nearly ten out of 25 countries in the region
have at some point set off on a near-hyperinflationary course.
Turning now to enterprises.  Technology and skills (including
managerial ability and entrepreneurial flair) are clearly essential
3ingredients for good enterprise performance, but the macroeconomic
environment surrounding the enterprise is no less relevant.
Comparable projects and enterprises perform very differently in
countries with differing macroeconomic and regulatory policies.  If
these policies provide stable signals and support low transaction
costs the quality of enterprise decisions, and thus the odds of
success, improve.
The firm can be viewed as a “nexus of contracts”, both
contracts internal to the organisation of the firm itself (i.e. labour
and management contracts and implicit or explicit contracts
involving the other stakeholders in the firm, including equity owners
and creditors etc.), and contracts between the firm and external
agents such as suppliers, customers, local and national government
agencies and private interest groups with which the firm interacts in
the market place or through non-market networks and modes of
interaction.4  The macroeconomic framework — encompassing
inflation, taxation, public spending, stability of domestic and
international relative prices (including intertemporal relative prices),
convertibility etc. — is a factor of fundamental importance for
negotiating, interpreting, complying with and enforcing contracts.
Chart I.1 provides a bird’s eye view of how the macroeconomic
environment conditions enterprise performance.
4Chart I-1
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The paper is organised as follows.  In Section II the two main
sources of macroeconomic stability, threats to the solvency of the
state and to the net worth of the financial sector, are discussed.  In
Section III a cursory review of the determinants of successful
enterprise performance is presented.  Special focus is given to the
effects of macroeconomic distortions.  Section IV focuses
quantitatively on the link between enterprise performance and the
macroeconomic environment.  The results and implications of some
simulation studies are reviewed.  These simulations compare the
financial returns on three stylised EBRD projects — two operating
in the internationally exposed sector (an exporting enterprise and an
import-competing enterprise) and the other in the non-traded sector,
that is the local market, sheltered from international competition —
in each of a number of countries in transition.  The three projects are
technically identical and the enterprises have identical gearing ratios
across countries, but the macroeconomic environment faced by the
firms differs from country to country.  We also emphasise the
distinction between so-called greenfield investments and investments
in pre-existing, non-traded assets.  Some other relevant empirical
evidence on the relation between macroeconomic stability and
enterprise performance is also reviewed.  In Section V, we review the
5empirical evidence on the relationship, at the aggregate level,
between the strength of macroeconomic reform and the performance
of the real economy.  Finally, in Section VI some conclusions are
drawn on: the speed of transition; the synergy between
macrostabilisation and market development; and the institutions
required to achieve and preserve a stable macroeconomy.
II. SOURCES OF MACROECONOMIC INSTABILITY
A. Solvency of the State
Macroeconomic shocks can originate abroad or at home and within
the public sector or the private sector.  Macroeconomic management
and policy rules, together with private sector decision rules, affect
the transmission, amplification or damping of shocks, wherever they
may originate.  Yet it is fair to say that serious and persistent
macroeconomic instability is almost always5 a reflection of the
problems faced by the state in achieving a sustainable non-
inflationary fiscal and financial position.6
Resources for servicing the outstanding domestic and foreign
debt must ultimately come from two sources: primary budget
surpluses (that is, current non-interest revenues in excess of current
non-interest outlays) and seigniorage (that is, the resources
appropriated by the state through the printing of money by the
central bank).  Monetary growth in excess of the growth rate of real
productive capacity will sooner or later result in inflation:
seigniorage turns into the inflation tax.  The amount of real resources
that governments obtain through the inflation tax is limited: as the
rate of inflation rises — as the inflation tax rate increases — the
private sector substitutes for domestic money with domestic and
foreign assets (hard currencies) that are better hedges against
inflation — the inflation tax base decreases.  For example in Russia,
the share of foreign currency deposits in the banking sector increased
from 20 per cent in December 1991 to 50 per cent in March 1993,
hovering at that level thereafter.  As inflation rises beyond a
6threshold, the inflation tax base — the monetary base as a
proportion of GDP — declines more than proportionally.  The result
is that real revenues from inflation decline as the inflation rate
explodes.
Inflation has other effects on the public finances as well.  First
there is the Olivera-Tanzi effect, according to which real tax
revenues may decline with high rates of inflation as tax payers delay
the settlement of tax liabilities.  Since tax liabilities are generally not
indexed to inflation or subject to an enforceable interest rate,
delaying payment may reduce the real value of payments in a
dramatic manner.  A similar phenomenon occurs with the payment
of electricity and water tariffs owed to public utilities.  Indeed, if
monthly inflation jumps from, say, 10 to 20 per cent and the average
tax (or tariff) collection lag is six months, the tax payer can nearly
halve her real burden by settling taxes on the last day of the
semester.  To protect tax revenues from inflationary erosion, in 1992
the Russian authorities established a system of monthly advance
payments for both the VAT and the profit tax.
There are also effects on taxes going in the opposite direction.
As the Polish example shows, under conditions of tight compliance
and short collection lags, historical cost accounting meant that
taxable enterprise profits greatly overstated true profits during the
high-inflation episode of 1990.  When inflation subsided in 1991,
both accounting profits and enterprise tax receipts collapsed (see
Schaffer (1992)).
Insolvency of the state can result in hyperinflation.  Examples
are Russia in 1992, Armenia during 1993, Georgia since 1993 and
the Ukraine in 1993.  The consequences are devastating.  When, at
last, the deterioration of the fiscal situation can no longer be denied
or ignored (because access to international borrowing has vanished
and domestic financial markets are unable or unwilling to absorb
additional government debt), the common absence of a coherent
stabilisation programme makes a bad situation worse.
It is true that recent evidence supports the view that the swift
and decisive stabilisation of a previously highly unstable
macroeconomy need not be associated with even a transitory decline
7in real economic activity and may indeed boost economic growth in
the short run (see Easterly (1996) and Bruno and Easterly (1996)).
However, even “at full employment”, stabilisation, with its
associated spending cuts and tax increases, is bound to be painful,
no matter how well the stabilisation package is designed and
implemented.  The policy measures governments actually tend to
resort to, frequently with the naive intent of forestalling the worst,
often turn out to be extremely (and in part unnecessarily) painful for
households and firms.  Neither the time nor the political will for
designing and implementing a coherent stabilisation package are
easily found in the near-panic atmosphere of a hyperinflation.  The
state is often tempted to increase its arrears to the private sector,
thus creating cash-flow problems for private suppliers and
undermining the credibility of the state as the arbiter of contract
disputes and the enforcer of the rule of law in economic affairs.
Another emergency measure to cut (or at any rate to postpone)
spending is sequestration (the withholding by the ministry of
finance of previously authorised funds from the spending
departments).  This has been practised extensively in the Russian
Federation during the past couple of years.  It may be somewhat less
damaging than government arrears for the development of a social
consensus on the importance of the rule of law in economic affairs
and on the importance of honouring contracts.  It is nevertheless a
deplorable and costly practice which does not belong in a normal
fiscal policy instrumentarium.  Emergency taxes are introduced,
often in an arbitrary and haphazard manner, without much thought
as to their administration nor as regards their incentive and
distributional effects.  Convertibility restrictions and multiple
exchange rates frequently are imposed, damaging international trade
and financial transactions, in a (vain) attempt to make scarce foreign
exchange go further.  Attempts to suppress the symptoms of a real
scarcity of loanable funds lead to interest-rate ceilings well below
the equilibrium level of interest rates and to the administrative
allocation of funds at highly subsidised rates to politically favoured
borrowers.
8B. Solvency of Financial Institutions
The financial troubles of enterprises transmit and manifest
themselves first as illiquidity, and later often as insolvency of their
creditors — in transition economies mainly banks.  Government
assistance to recapitalise banks as their non-performing loans to
ailing borrowers pile up (or to settle inter-enterprise arrears owed to
viable firms) puts further strain on already tight state budgets.
Stabilisation itself, even in the absence of significant structural
change, is often associated with a build up of bad loans.  This is
because, as shown in Chart II.1, successful disinflation tends to lead,
initially, to very high — and volatile — ex-post real interest rates on
local currency loans.
Chart II.1
Real Ex-Post Interest Rates
(quarterly rates measured in annual percentage rates)
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9local currency occurred during the period.
Clearly, high and volatile real rates are apt to cause financial
distress to debtors.  High real deposit rates, reflecting the risk
premium that needs to be paid to depositors to compensate for the
risk of default of the deposit-taking institutions, mirror the high real
lending rates charged by these to make up for potential losses
stemming from the odds of borrower bankruptcy.  Both the
stabilisation programme and the risk of its failure contribute to these
risk premia.  High nominal rates alone — even if real rates were low
— can cause cash-flow problems because debtors are forced into
accelerated and premature amortisation, in real terms, of their debt,
whenever they are not able to add to their borrowing an amount
equal to the reduction in the real value of their domestic currency
debt due to inflation.
Structural transformation exposes creditors to severe
counterparty risk as debtors are faced unexpectedly with adverse
developments beyond their control.  As key relative prices change,
as new competitors erode monopoly profits, as new markets emerge
and old ones vanish, previously creditworthy borrowers may become
insolvent.  All of these stresses and strains are of course present,
qualitatively, even in an economy that does not suffer any
macroeconomic instability: macroeconomic equilibrium is consistent,
in a dynamic, evolving economic system, with a considerable amount
of microeconomic flux at the sectoral and individual firm levels.  The
implementation of stabilisation policies does, however, add
quantitatively to the incidence of dislocation, insolvency and
bankruptcy.  So do structural adjustment policies of the kind
pursued in Latin America since the debt crisis of 1981/82.
It is during the transition from plan to market, a process
involving macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment on
an unprecedented scale, that the problems and risks facing
enterprises are most acute.  This is obviously true as regards the
backlog of loans incurred during the pre-reform era (the so-called
balance sheet or stock problem).  It remains true even now that
reform appears to be here to stay.  Even competent bankers would
10
have little evidence on which to base their assessment of the
creditworthiness of loan applicants.  Few potential borrowers have
much of a track record or credit history and for those that do, the
past is likely to be a poor guide to the future: what made for
enterprise success under central planning may bear little relationship
to what is required for effective enterprise performance in a market
regime.  To compound the problem, oversight of banks by the
monetary authorities is initially weak and judiciary procedures to
repossess collateral are typically cumbersome.  Real estate markets
and land registries are typically underdeveloped and the legal and
institutional framework for securing mortgages is severely restrictive.
Secured transactions in movable property are rare and costly.  All
this greatly adds to both the cost of starting up a new business, and
to the cost of doing business generally.  Thus, the second problem of
financial intermediation concerns the difficulty encountered by
banks (and other lenders) in discriminating between good and bad
risks when extending new loans (the flow problem).
Furthermore, like any bail-out by the state, recapitalisation of
banks — or a clearance of interenterprise arrears involving an
element of state subsidy — can give rise to moral hazard (why
engage in costly appraisal of borrowers if losses will be made up by
the silent public partner with the deep pockets?) and adverse
selection (the selection of projects that are excessively risky from a
social point of view, because the bank gets the positive returns in the
good states of nature while the state picks up the tab in the bad
states of nature).  Deposit insurance further encourages lending on
excessively risky projects as the banks do not have to worry about
bank runs by depositors fearful of bank default.  When the banks in
question are private, both moral hazard and adverse selection can be
reduced by ensuring that the existing owners of the bank lose all
their equity before any public sector money goes in.  For managers
capable of exercising control without significant equity stakes, moral
hazard and adverse selection can be countered by the threat of being
fired without a golden parachute if the bank performs badly and, to
the extent that managerial markets are developing, by the cost of loss
of reputation.   An idea of the burden to the public treasury of the
11
bad loan problem is given by the experience of Hungary where some
banks have been recapitalised in one way or another every year since
1990.  The total injection of public funds from 1992 to 1995
amounts to about 8 per cent of 1994-GDP.7
The flow of funds from the state budget to enterprises is often
intermediated through the banking sector.  If the government bails
out insolvent enterprises or banks directly through subsidies, this
increases the conventionally measured budget deficit.  If instead it
instructs the central bank to provide subsidised credit to the
enterprise, the subsidy element — the difference between the market
rate and the subsidised rate times the amount of the loan — would,
in principle, show up in the so-called quasi-fiscal deficit of the
central bank.  A calculation by De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996)
of the contribution of the quasi-fiscal deficit to the total “true” state
budget imbalance is provided in Table II.1.  For countries in the
early stages of transition the quasi-fiscal deficit has reached as much
as four times the conventional fiscal deficit and indeed can make the
overall public sector imbalance become as high as 40 per cent of
GDP (Kazakstan 1992) or 33 per cent of GDP (Belarus 1992).  As
these levels are bound to be beyond the maximum attainable long-
run ratio of the inflation tax-to-GDP, they threaten to precipitate
countries onto a hyperinflationary path.
12
Table II.1
Fiscal and Quasi-Fiscal Deficits for Selected Countriesa: 1992-
93
(Per cent of GDP)
Fiscal Deficits Central Bank
Implicit Subsidyb
Total
Budget Deficits
Advanced Transition b 1992 1993 1992   1993 1992 1993
Czech Rep 0.5 -0.6 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.2
Slovakia 13.1 7.6 0.3 1.7 13.4 9.3
Intermediate Transition
Bulgaria 5.0 11.1 1.3 0.8 6.3 11.9
Estonia -0.5 1.4 - 0.2 - 1.6
Romania 5.5 1.0 5.9 3.9 11.4 4.9
Early Transition
Kazakhstan 7.3 1.2 32.7 - 40.0 -
Belarus 6.4 9.4 26.5 9.3 32.9 18.7
Turkmenistan 10.1 3.6 12.5 21.2 22.6 24.8
Uzbekistan 10.2 8.4 13.1 18.5 23.3 26.9
a) Quasi-fiscal deficit defined in a narrow sense because it excludes foreign
exchange and other losses.  Implicit subsidies from the central bank to
commercial banks and economy due to difference between the central
bank refinancing rate and inflation.  Annual figures are averages of
quarterly figures.
b) The other countries of advanced transition, like Hungary and Poland,
appear to show negligible central bank interest rate subsidies.
Source:  De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996)
Even harder to estimate than the quasi-fiscal deficit of the
central bank is what we shall call the deferred (contingent) fiscal
deficit.  Instead of providing enterprises with explicitly subsidised
loans, the central bank could lend to them at market rates, that is,
without any explicit subsidy element being provided ex-ante.
Nevertheless, both parties to the loan may be perfectly aware that in
due course the contractual debt service payments will not be
enforced (wholly or partly).  What appears to be a loan on market
terms is in fact a capital grant.8  When and how this resource transfer
13
from the public to the private sector should be recorded in the
accounts is a matter of some dispute.  Rather than engaging in any
‘lending’ to the enterprise sector itself, the central bank could
encourage commercial banks to do the lending, with the central bank
(implicitly) guaranteeing the loans.  If this ‘guarantee’ is called, the
central bank would be bailing out a commercial bank which got into
trouble because it bailed out a non-viable state enterprise.  Until the
crisis hits, the deferred fiscal deficit would be hidden in the balance
sheets (the non-performing loans) of the commercial bank sector
III. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AS A
DETERMINANT
OF ENTERPRISE DECISION MAKING AND
PERFORMANCE
A. Sources of Differential Enterprise Performance
Macroeconomic or economy-wide conditions influence enterprise
performance in three ways: (i) through the quantity and quality of
the endowment of factors of production in each country; (ii) through
the country’s market structure and the regulatory and tax
environment; (iii) through the stability of the domestic (and the
international) macroeconomic environment.
Most transition economies are characterised by a serious
imbalance between the availability of physical capital, including
infrastructure, which is often obsolete, and of human capital, which
tends to be relatively skilled and abundant.  While some of the skills
specific to the market service sectors (accountancy, auditing,
financial expertise, marketing, market-minded public administration
etc.) are now in relatively short supply, any short- to medium-run
shortages in these areas can be remedied more easily than the
shortfall in modern physical plant and equipment.  The physical
capital deficiency is in general most severe in the countries of the
FSU.  Hence, raising the rate of capital formation is a sine qua non
14
for sustained growth.  The government can contribute to this process
by promoting investment in infrastructure.  Raising the capital
formation rate will, of course, only have the hoped-for productivity
effects if the additional capital resources can be allocated to their
most profitable uses (in the case of private investment) or to the uses
with the highest social rate of return (in the case of public sector
capital formation).  The underdeveloped state of the domestic
financial markets, and of most of the institutions involved in the
intermediation process, caps both the private and the social return to
investment.  Removing these bottlenecks, or at least ensuring that the
government itself does not contribute to them through acts of
omission or commission, should be a priority for economic policy
makers.
Enterprise performance is influenced by the regulatory
framework and the structure of product and input markets.  Opening
up the economy to external competition is the most effective way of
exposing internationally tradable sectors, including most of industry,
agriculture and the natural resource sectors, to the efficiency-
enhancing spur of world competition.  In the sheltered sectors not
subject to international competition, which include services
(banking, transportation, wholesale and retail trade, utilities etc.),
government action is required to remove barriers to entry imposed by
incumbents trying to increase and/or protect their margins and rents.
The very least any government should do to promote transition
is to respect the important ‘negative list’ of things it should not do.
The key ‘don’t’ is the injunction not to get in the way of legitimate
private initiative through excessive and intrusive regulation, entry-
restricting licensing requirements, competition-distorting subsidies or
a punitive, arbitrary and unpredictable tax code.  More ‘positive’
interventions include the provision of the public good of price
stability, that is, of a stable measure of value; the enforcement of
private property rights and the rule of law; and the creation of a
stable institutional framework for regulation and taxation, conducive
to private economic activity.  Two aspects of the tax structure faced
by enterprises are critical.  The first is the quality of the design of the
rules — in terms of neutrality, universality and fairness.  The second
15
is the predictability of the rules over time.  Enterprises may (up to a
point) be able to live with an ‘imperfect’ tax or regulatory system, as
long as its incidence and enforcement are systematic, predictable and
stable.  Governments that ceaselessly design and redesign tax rules
impose costly and avoidable uncertainty on firms and markets.
The macroeconomic environment interacts with market
structure, regulatory and tax environments to influence the
behaviour of enterprises.  For instance, a system of collective
bargaining — or more generally, the negotiation of and compliance
with any contract — that would function well in a low inflation
environment can be wholly dysfunctional under high and volatile
inflation.  The latter creates uncertainty about the real value of any
contract.  The duration of price, wage and financial contracts tends
to shorten with higher inflation and spurious costs in time and effort
go into adversarial bargaining sessions.
Another example of how macroeconomic instability
undermines the effectiveness of the regulatory and fiscal framework
is given by the sharp changes introduced by inflation in the effective
rates of taxation (ERT) of capital9.  The MERT model can be used
to illustrate these effects.  First, for a specific project, the MERT
model generates a multi-period cash flow, on the assumption of a
constant general price level.  The internal rate of return (IRR) before
taxes is calculated for this cash flow.  Then the entire relevant set of
tax and subsidy policies appropriate to the project is imposed (profit
taxes, depreciation allowances, interest deductibility, investment tax
credits, tax holidays etc.) on this cash flow.  The before-tax cash
flow is assumed to be independent of these taxes and subsidies.  The
after-tax IRR is then calculated.  The effective tax rate is the
difference between the before-tax and after-tax IRRs, expressed as a
percentage of the before-tax IRR.
The exercise is then repeated for some positive rate of inflation.
The before-tax real cash flow is assumed to be independent of the
rate of inflation.  The distortionary effects of inflation come from the
fact that the real value of taxes and subsidies will vary with the rate
of inflation.  The after-tax IRR on the project is therefore different
with positive inflation from what it was with zero inflation.  This
16
difference in the after-tax IRRs is the effect of inflation on the
marginal effective rate of taxation.
An illustration of how the ERT for a given project (that is, for a
given technology, capital structure and relative prices of inputs and
outputs), in fact, one financed by the EBRD, varies depending on
the country’s tax code and inflation rate, is provided in Tables III.1,
III.2 and III.3.10
Table III.1
ERT with the Tax Code of Hungary
Annual No collection lags Collection lag: 6 months
Inflation Debt-to-equity ratio Dept-to-equity ratio
0 0.5 0 0.5
Baseline:           0% 38% 36% 38% 36%
1998 forecast:  15% 42% 38% 39% 35%
1994 actual:     21% 43% 38% 39% 34%
1990 actual:     33% 45% 38% 39% 33%
Table III.2
ERT with the Tax Code of Russia
Annual No collection lags Collection lag: 6 months
Inflation Debt-to-equity ratio Dept-to-equity ratio
0 0.5 0 0.5
Baseline:            0% 32% 33% 32% 33%
1998 forecast:  15% 38% 35% 32% 30%
1994 actual:     21% 53% 40% 29% 22%
1990 actual:     33% 67% 45% 20% 14%
Table III.3
Cross Country Comparisons of ERT
1994 Collection Lag (months)
Country Annual Inflation 0 6
Bulgaria 122% 55% 36%
Czech Republic 11% 51% 49%
Poland 29% 47% 41%
Romania 62% 61% 47%
Slovak Republic 12% 42% 40%
Slovenia 18% 41% 37%
Ukraine 401% 45% 10%
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Note: Calculations assume a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.5 and full interest
deductibility from taxable income for all countries in the table.
These Tables also contain sensitivity analyses of the ERT to
inflation, to variations in the debt-equity ratio and to tax collection
lags are provided for the tax codes of Hungary and Russia.  As
shown, the ERT of capital for the project using Russia’s tax code
can be as low as 32 per cent (with zero inflation) and as high as 67
per cent (with annual inflation at 843 per cent, the 1993 figure, the
debt-to-equity ratio at zero and no collection lags).  Assuming the
same annual inflation rate, 843 per cent, but with a collection lag of
six months and a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.5, the ERT drops to 14
per cent.  A similar range of variation results across countries.  The
ERT of the identical project fluctuates from 10 per cent in Ukraine
1994 (assuming a collection lag of six months) and 61 per cent in
Romania 1994 (no collection lags).  Not surprisingly, the country in
which the project in question was indeed successfully carried out
(Hungary) is where the ERT displays the narrowest range of
variation under the different assumptions, between a low of 33 per
cent and a high of 45 per cent.  These examples bear out that the
real burden imposed by a given tax code clearly is not inflation-
neutral.  As inflation changes the ERT is subject to countervailing
forces that do not cancel out.  On the one hand, the historic cost
accounting of depreciation allowances and input inventories (first in-
first out or FIFO accounting) tends to overstate taxable profits when
inflation is high.  On the other hand, collection lags and the
deductability from taxable profits of the nominal interest on the debt
tend to reduce the tax burden on the firm.
B. Macroeconomic Distortions
It is a robust empirical finding that high inflation is associated with
(i) highly variable and uncertain inflation and (ii) high relative price
variability and unpredictability.  This impairs the effectiveness of the
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tax and regulatory environments, as well as that of the price
mechanism in signalling changes in relative scarcities requiring a
reallocation of resources.  High inflation produces a distortion of
market signals and results in a worsening of co-ordination among
economic agents’ decisions.  In extreme cases it severely impairs the
proper functioning of a decentralised market economy.
Unanticipated inflation in addition redistributes real resources from
holders of nominally denominated debt instruments towards the
issuers of such instruments.  With imperfect indexation of tax
brackets, benefits and wage contracts, further arbitrary
redistributions of wealth and income are associated with imperfectly
anticipated inflation.  It is this, rather than the esoteric “shoe-
leather” and “menu costs” of fully anticipated inflation, that
constitutes the true social cost of inflation.11
The empirical association between high and volatile inflation
results both from features of the price and wage-setting mechanisms
and from political economy processes.  Inflation is often the visible,
monetary manifestation of unresolved social conflict about public
spending and its financing. The resolution of such ‘wars of attrition’
is a highly uncertain process.  Both high inflation, and the
anticipation of (eventual) fiscal and monetary corrections to control
it, increase the uncertainty of the economic environment within
which firms make production, employment and investment decisions.
Future fiscal measures and realignment of key prices will affect
business profitability.  Fiscal retrenchment tends to be associated
with a cyclical decline in economic activity, employment and real
wages and with a nominal and real depreciation of the currency.12
Stability of macroeconomic policy appears to be a much more
important spur to private investment than reductions in statutory tax
rates and interest rates of the magnitude that are commonly
experienced.13 The generous tax holidays enacted in the Ukraine
during the period of hyperinflation and turmoil (1993—94),
including a constitutional provision whereby tax benefits could not
be repealed by future legislation, were completely ineffective in
attracting foreign investment.14
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Investment involves the commitment of resources today in
anticipation of future, uncertain returns.  When a firm acquires a unit
of capital today, it can be viewed as engaging in three transactions.
First, it acquires a unit of capital that is completely ‘sunk’, that is,
neither reversible nor expandable.  Second, it acquires a (put) option
to sell that unit of capital at a future sale price that may be different
from the current price.  The value of this put option increases with
the uncertainty affecting the returns to the investment and with the
future resale price.  With completely irreversible investment, the
value of the put would be zero.  Third, it gives up or extinguishes a
(call) option to purchase that unit of capital at a future purchase
price that may also be different from the current price, rather than
buying it today.  Increased uncertainty concerning the returns to the
investment increases the value of the call option, as does a lower
future purchase price.  If future expansion is completely impossible,
the value of the call is zero (see Abel, Dixit, Eberly and Pindyck
(1995) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).  As long as the investment is
not completely irreversible, the value of the put option increases
with the uncertainty surrounding the future returns to the
investment, and investment today is encouraged.  As long as future
expansion is not completely impossible, the value of the call option
falls with the uncertainty surrounding the future earnings stream, and
investment today is discouraged.  Whether on balance the response
of investment to increased uncertainty is positive or negative is an
empirical issue.  Regardless of whether investment is expanded or
contracted (brought forward or delayed), real economic performance
worsens as a result of the increase in uncertainty as the firm (and the
economy) is more likely to be stuck with excess or deficient
capacity.  Recent firm-level empirical evidence for the US suggests
that an increase in uncertainty depresses investment (see Leahy and
Whited (1996)).  The empirical evidence surveyed by Pindyck and
Solimano (1993) also suggests that investment is more likely to be
delayed and depressed in the aftermath of stabilisation in high
inflation countries.  If the limited expandability effect dominates the
limited reversibility effect (that is, if future expansion is easier than
future reversal), it would indeed be rational for investors to exercise
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a wait and see option (see Dornbusch (1990)).  Only when
sufficient commitment to the reform process is shown and a track
record is established does private investment resume strongly.  This
may also account for the fact that FDI in the region has been meagre
so far and heavily concentrated in the core of central European
countries (the Visegrad four).  In 1994, total FDI in the 25 countries
of operation of EBRD barely reached US$ 6 billion, a figure roughly
comparable to that of Mexico in the same year.
Short-termism in contracts can be an individually rational
response to instability.  In addition, private markets, for reasons that
are not fully understood, often do not fully index the capital value of
long-term outstanding debt but do fully index short-term interest
rates.  In this borrowing environment loans inevitably become very
short-term.  The long-term financing of investment may be
impossible, borrowers are faced continuously with the problem of
rolling over their debt and the risk of a credit crunch is ever present.
The shortening of wage contracts, particularly those subject to
backward-looking indexation to inflation, creates further upward
pressure on the inflation rate.15  High inflation also diverts resources
towards privately profitable, but socially unproductive, activities
such as hyperactive enterprise financial management and rent
seeking.  Typically, the financial and public relations managers of
enterprises become more senior and better paid than the production,
R&D and design managers.
Inflation is neither the only manifestation of macroeconomic
instability, nor the only macroeconomic evil distorting enterprise
decision-making.  Macroeconomic instability affects households
through inflation and through the likelihood and duration of
unemployment.  Even in those countries that have public
unemployment insurance16 programmes, the standard of living of a
worker falls sharply when he or she is made redundant.  Much of an
individual’s unemployment and labour income risk is idiosyncratic,
that is, specific to the individual rather than general.  Idiosyncratic
risk is, in principle, diversifiable.  Adverse selection and moral
hazard problems are the reasons most individual labour income and
unemployment risk nevertheless cannot be insured privately17.
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Unemployment risk does have a common component, however,
reflecting economy-wide macroeconomic developments, both
cyclical and structural.  Since these aggregate or common risks
cannot be insured (although the income consequences for the
unemployed can be), economic performance can be enhanced only
by minimising the shocks that perturb the unemployment rate.
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C. Distributional Aspects of Inflation
The historical record shows that indexation is always imperfect in
reality (even in countries with long experience of high inflation such
as Brazil).  This means that high inflation brings about major
redistributions of resources away from domestic currency creditors
and towards domestic currency debtors, and more generally from the
economically weak and unsophisticated to the agile and well-
connected.  Table III.4 presents a case study for Russia (1992—93)
showing the incidence of ‘inflation taxes and subsidies’ across
households, enterprises, the government, other FSU republics, and
the financial sector.  Households and enterprises are net payers
whereas the government, other republics, and the financial sector are
net beneficiaries.  Regarding enterprises, in general those that pay
the inflation tax are productive firms while those who receive the
inflation subsidy are often inefficient firms resisting restructuring or
closure.  Also, since workers’ financial portfolios are largely
restricted to transaction cash balances, the inflation tax can quite
accurately be viewed as an outright wealth tax on wage earners.
The regressive nature of the inflation tax has been extensively
documented in countries with chronic high inflation18.
Table III.4
Losers and Winners with Inflation in Russia (1992—1993)
(per cents of GDP)
Gross
inflation
tax paid
Gross
inflation
subsidy
Net inflation
tax(+)/
Subsidy(-)
Total 30.90% 30.90%
Households 12.04% 12.04%
Enterprises 18.86% 16.31% 2.55%
Other republics 2.19% -2.19%
Government (net) of which: 4.07% -4.07%
      on loans (+) (+ 7.19%)
      on deposits (-) (- 3.13%)
Residual (notional monetary
system profits) 8.34% -8.34%
Source: Easterly and Vieira da Cunha (1994)
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The underlying problem generating macroeconomic instability
is the unsustainability of fiscal and financial policies.  Occasionally
governments are able to “repress” inflation for a while by borrowing
heavily, mostly from abroad.  For a given budget deficit,
governments often confront a short-run trade-off between monetary
financing and external borrowing (i.e. a trade-off between lower
inflation and a higher deficit in the current account of the balance of
payments).19 As the public debt builds up, however, this strategy
eventually leads to a foreign exchange crisis and subsequent high
inflation.  Enterprise decisions — predicated upon the relative prices
and rules prevailing prior to the crisis — may have translated into
production processes that are no longer financially viable at the
post-crisis relative price configuration.  The resulting sunk costs
impose heavy dead-weight losses on society.  In the aftermath of the
Mexican crisis, some analysts feared that a similar collapse might
affect Hungary in early 1995.  However, the longer average maturity
of the Hungarian debt and the swift announcement by the authorities
of corrective policy measures allowed the crisis to be dispelled at the
time.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTS
OF THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ON
ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE
A. Simulations of the Financial Performance of Three Stylised
Projects Across Several Countries in Transition:
Introduction
In order to analyse the financial performance of projects across
different macroeconomic environments, the researcher would ideally
like to be able to observe the behaviour during a given period of
‘identical’ projects across a group of countries with different
macroeconomic environments.  A practical alternative consists of
simulating the performance of a common project (or bundle of
projects) using the actual historical observations on the key
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macroeconomic variables for each of the countries.  This is the
approach followed here.
An investor (henceforth the Fund) is assumed to be interested
in the ECU returns to financing ‘identical projects’ in six countries
in transition with very different macro-environments.  The countries
are the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Group 1), Romania
(Group 2), Ukraine (Group 3) and Russia (Group 4).
A project is defined by a production technology (linking output
with fixed coefficients to intermediate inputs, labour and capital
services) and a financial structure (domestic and foreign currency-
denominated interest-bearing debt).  The period of analysis is 1990-I
to 1994-IV.  The first project, referred to as the ‘exportable’ project,
is calibrated on a chocolate manufacturer.  The second project,
referred to as the ‘import-competing’ project, is modelled on a bottle
manufacturer.  The third project, the ‘non-tradable’ project, is a firm
providing cargo-transportation services in the national market.  Both
‘greenfield’ investments, assumed to be characterised by a common
(industry-and country-independent) price of capital and investments
in existing assets (which can involve a discount on the price of
existing capital) are considered.
The gross return, measured in ECU, on an ECU invested in the
equity of industry j, denoted qj , j = x, m, n can be written as in
equations (1), (2) and (3) below2021.  We assume each enterprise is
wound up at the end of the period and that the undepreciated part of
the capital stock is sold.  We also assume that the rate of inflation of
capital goods prices is the same as the general domestic rate of
inflation.  We use the following notation: pK j
is the price of a unit of
capital in sector j in terms of the price of the exportable good; pj is
the net output per unit of capital in sector j; aij is the amount of
input i used per unit of capital in the production of good j; pm  is the
relative price of imports to exports; pn is the relative price of non-
traded goods to exports and w is the wage in terms of the exportable
good; i is the domestic one-period contractual nominal interest rate;
p is the domestic rate of inflation, i* is the foreign one-period
contractual nominal rate of interest; dj  is the proportional rate of
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depreciation of capital in sector j; g is the proportional rate of
depreciation of the nominal spot exchange rate; tj is the tax
(measured in exportables) per unit of capital in sector j; dj is the
ratio of domestic currency debt to capital in sector j and d j*  the ratio
of foreign currency debt to capital in sector j.
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Let zj  be the resources (per ECU worth of capital) available first for
servicing debt and then for paying out to shareholders in sector j..
For instance, in the export sector,
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Assume domestic currency debt and ECU debt are of equal
seniority.  With an uncertain earnings stream, default becomes a
possibility and the return on a loan becomes potentially risky.  The
(gross) rate of return on a domestic currency-denominated loan to
sector j, 1 + i j
~
, is given by
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The gross rate of return on an ECU loan to sector j, 1+ i j
~*
, is given by
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In what follows we focus on the computation and
characterisation of the mean-variance efficient frontier, the set of
portfolios with the lowest variance of returns for any given mean
return.  Other than equity participations in, and domestic and foreign
currency loans to, the three sectors in the transition economies under
consideration, the only other use of resources by the Fund is
investment in safe ECU-denominated loans at a rate i*.  We report
only the results on the composition of the portfolio of risky assets.
In addition to the constraint that sum of all investments is equal to
the Fund’s total resources, we impose a number of further equality
and inequality constraints on the portfolio selection of the Fund.
These constraints are typical of the constraints imposed by statute or
convention on real-world Funds of the kind whose behaviour we are
trying to model.  They are as follows:
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1) No short sales of equity.
2) Total equity investment not to exceed paid-in capital.
3) The Fund can borrow at the local and international risk-free
rates. It only lends to transition economy enterprises at the
higher contractual rates.
4) Total equity investments and loans not to exceed total capital.
5) No home currency risk exposure in the loan portfolio.
We simulate the behaviour of three sector-specific investment
projects in the historical economic environments of the six transition
countries between 1992 and 1994, interpreting the sample moments
as estimates of the (conditional) means, variances and covariances of
mean-variance portfolio analysis.  We first focus on ‘greenfield
investments’ so that the price of capital is identical across sectors
and countries: if i is the country index, pKxi
pKmi
pKni
= = = 1.
For our greenfield calculations, we assume that during the first
period productivity levels in a given industry are the same in all
countries.  Productivity levels for countries and sectors in
subsequent periods are derived endogenously for the remaining
periods using both directly available and indirectly derived
productivity growth data.  We then discuss the case of investment in
existing assets, that can trade at a discount or premium.
For a more extensive discussion of the data and the
intermediate steps involved in computing the return distributions, see
Buiter, Lago and Rey (1997).  Lack of data forces us to make the
assumption that productivity is the same in the two traded sectors.
Both the short run of data and their generally low quality mean that
our results are to be taken as illustrative only.
Input-output coefficients (measured as inputs per unit of
capital) were extracted from the balance sheets of enterprises of the
three sectors as presented in EBRD investment reports.  The projects
considered are a chocolate producer for the export sector, a bottle
manufacturer for the import-competing sector and a transportation
company for the non-traded sector.  They have no claim to
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generality but are consistent with the findings of Lankes and
Venables (1996) who state that in their sample export supply
projects are ‘‘import intensive’’ and ‘‘skilled labour intensive’’, the
labour bill accounting for 24% of the costs.  These coefficients are
assumed constant over the period of time considered (1992—1994).
Gearing ratios of approximately 18% for both domestic and
foreign currency loans, tax rates of 10% and depreciation rates of
6% were also found in the balance sheets.
Table IV.1
Input/Output Export Import Non-traded
Export 0 0
Import 62.48 0.1
Non-traded 2.56 11.18
Labour 17.15 3.81 10.4
B. Returns on Investments
B.1. Greenfield Investments
We now estimate returns on greenfield investments.  They are shown
in Tables IV.2 to IV.5.  The returns are gross.  The contractual
interest rates on foreign currency loans are Libor + 150 for Group 1,
Libor + 300 for Groups 2 and 4, Libor + 450 for Group 3.
Contractual interest rates on domestic currency loans are domestic
bank loan rates as provided by IFS data.  Gearing ratios, taxes, input
output coefficients, initial productivity levels are the same for all
sectors and all countries.  Returns differ because of different relative
prices and wages, different productivity levels, interest rates,
inflation rates and exchange rate movements.  They are thus
determined by the interaction of the same microstructure and
different macroeconomic conditions.
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Table IV.2
Group 1
Expected Return Standard Deviation
qx 1.37 0.21
qm 1.09 0.11
qn 1.14 0.11
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i x g 1.18 0.11
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i m g 1.18 0.11
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i n g 1.18 0.11
1+ i x
~* 1.06 0.01
1+ i m
~* 1.06 0.01
1+ i n
~* 1.06 0.01
Table IV.3
Group 2
Expected Return Standard Deviation
qx 1.26 0.34
qm 1.05 0.28
qn 1.11 0.37
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i x g 0.63 0.32
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i m g 0.63 0.32
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i n g 0.63 0.32
1+ i x
~* 1.07 0.01
1+ i m
~* 1.07 0.01
1+ i n
~* 1.07 0.01
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Table IV.4
Group 3
Expected Return Standard Deviation
qx 0.57 0.55
qm 0.85 0.73
qn 0.67 0.58
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i x g 0.36 0.49
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i m g 0.36 0.49
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i n g 0.36 0.49
1+ i x
~* 0.73 0.63
1+ i m
~* 0.73 0.63
1+ i n
~* 0.73 0.63
Table IV.5
Group 4
Expected Return Standard Deviation
qx 0.54 0.48
qm 0.85 0.82
qn 0.69 0.74
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i x g 0.42 0.69
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i m g 0.42 0.69
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i n g 0.42 0.69
1+ i x
~* 0.72 0.62
1+ i m
~* 0.72 0.62
1+ i n
~* 0.72 0.62
Note that in Group 1 there is no default on any of the loans.  In
Group 2 there is no default on loans (although the ECU returns on
home currency loans are very poor due to very strong exchange rate
depreciation).  In Group 3 there are defaults on loans and equity22 in
the import-competing and non-traded good sectors.
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In Group 4, there are some defaults — on loans and equity —
in the three sectors.
The data we have on domestic interest rates are obviously not
excessively reliable.  When we look for the mean-variance efficient
portfolios, we will therefore limit ourselves to equity and foreign
currency loans.  But it is true that the bad quality of our data on
interest rates also affects — more indirectly — our returns on foreign
currency loans and equity.  Very shaky macroeconomic conditions
in Groups 3 and 4, for example, lead to extreme values of the real
interest rate and trigger default for some periods and some sectors.
Although the actual figures may not be terribly accurate, the
macroeconomic instability they reflect does seem to be genuine.  In
this respect, our results are quite suggestive.  Furthermore, in the
Pissarides, Singer and Svejnar (1996) survey, managers tend to rank
high interest rates as one of the most serious constraints they face.
From these results, we can see that greenfield investments are
generally dominated by investments in Groups 1 and 2: greenfield
investments have higher returns in countries which are in a more
advanced stage of transition.  Nevertheless, returns differ widely by
sector.  Loans can obviously be risky, either because of default risk
(in countries of groups 3 and 4) or because of currency risk.
Lankes and Venables (1996) link greenfield investments to the
control mode.  Wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign firms are more
likely to be greenfield investments and greenfield investments are
more likely to occur when foreign investors want complete control
of the entire production process of the company.  This motive is
especially powerful when there is strong emphasis on the quality of
the product.  Joint ventures are more attractive as a means of
providing information about and access to the local market and to
mitigate risk23.  Here we provide an alternative view — based on the
influence of macro conditions on micro performance — where
greenfield investments tend to be optimal in the countries which are
more advanced on the transition path.
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Optimal Portfolios of Greenfield Investments
We consider optimal portfolios consisting of risky investments only,
that is, safe ECU lending at the rate of interest i* is excluded.  The
available assets are foreign currency loans and equities.  We show
only the non-dominated part of the mean-variance-efficient frontier.
Columns 1 and 2 give the expected return and the standard deviation
of the portfolio.  In column 3, we show the proportion of the
optimal portfolio held in equity and in the other columns we have
put the respective contributions of the 4 groups of countries to the
optimal portfolio.
Table IV.6
Mean-Variance Efficient Portfolios of Greenfield Investments
Mean
returns
Standard
deviation
% equity Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
1.075 0.000 39.02 56.28 42.70 0.00 1.02
1.10 0.000 88.32 79.77 17.01 2.53 0.69
1.125 0.000 90.23 78.12 19.72 1.46 0.70
1.15 0.006 100.00 78.45 21.55 0.00 0.00
1.20 0.022 100.00 80.73 19.27 0.00 0.00
1.25 0.070 100.00 93.56 6.44 0.00 0.00
1.30 0.116 100.00 97.50 2.50 0.00 0.00
1.37 0.210 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
The proportion of equity increases as expected return and risk
(variance) rise along the mean-variance efficient frontier.  The share
of equity is equal to 100% for returns higher than 12.5%.  For the
lowest expected returns (7.5%) and the lowest risk, investing mainly
in loans to Groups 1 and 2 is optimal.  For expected returns between
10 and 12.5%, it is optimal to invest mostly in Groups 1 and 2 and
to diversify risk by small investments in Groups 3 and 4.  For a broad
range of expected returns (between 15% and 37%), investing
primarily in equities of group 1 is optimal, with some significant
participation in Group 2.  For the highest returns, only investments
in equity of Group 1 should be considered.  At no level of risk
tolerance do greenfield investments in the least advanced transition
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economies (Groups 3 and 4) take a significant place in the efficient
portfolio.  Investment in their debt is usually dominated.
These results would be strengthened if we had taken into
account differences in productivity levels across countries for the
initial period, as productivity in Group 1 might be taken to be higher
than that in the other groups, even in the case of greenfield
investments.  We only allow for such initial productivity differences
in the case of investments in existing assets, considered next.
B.2. Investments in Existing Assets
We now try to allow for the fact that existing assets can sell at a
discount in countries with unfavourable (macro)economic
conditions, that is, we allow the pK j
 to differ across countries.  Our
estimate of the magnitude of the existing asset price discount is based
on the deviation of the country’s exchange rate from the OECD’s
estimate of its PPP exchange rate for 1993.  No intra-industry
differences in the discounts on these assets can therefore be allowed
for.  These estimates of the prevailing asset price discount are likely
to be subject to wide margins of error.  The computations of the
optimal portfolios that follow are conditional on these estimates and
should therefore be treated with caution.  If the projects of a country
or group of countries do not succeed in pricing themselves into the
optimal portfolio with the asset price discounts we attribute to them,
there will always exist (higher) discounts for which these projects
will become viable.  That indeed is a central message of this paper: if
a country has a highly unfavourable macroeconomic environment, it
will pay for it through high discounts on the prices of its existing
immobile factors.
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Table IV.7
Discount prices with respect to group 1
Group Comparative price level (%)
2 64.78
3 37.37
4 54.82
The least advanced countries on the transition path have the
highest discounts on the price of their sunk capital.  Therefore, the
less advanced on the transition path, the bigger the incentive for
investing in existing assets ceteris paribus.  But here ceteris paribus
truly does mean holding a lot of other things constant.  The existing
capital the Fund can invest in is often obsolete, depending on the
countries and the sectors.  In the Pissarides, Singer and Svejnar
(1996) survey, managers in Bulgaria and Russia complain that
‘‘capital is old’’ and claim that this obsolescence is one of the most
binding constraints they face.  Therefore, while the assumption made
thus far, that productivity levels are the same across countries in the
initial period, may be suitable for greenfield investments, it is highly
questionable when we turn to investments in existing assets.  We
therefore make a correction for the relative levels of productivity
across countries for the initial period.  We take average Economy-
wide $PPP GDP per employee to estimate the relative productivity
levels at the beginning of the period.  We make the assumption that
initial productivity differences between countries are the same in the
three sectors.  Relative to Group 1, we find that Group 2 has an
initial level of productivity of 0.42, Group 3 of 0.64 and Group 4 of
0.72.
Returns on Investments in Existing Assets
The means and standard deviations of returns on equity investments
and loans in the three industries for each of the four groups are given
below in Tables IV.8 to IV.11.
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Table IV.8
Group 1
Expected Return Standard Deviation
qx 1.37 0.21
qm 1.09 0.11
qn 1.14 0.11
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i x g 1.18 0.11
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i m g 1.18 0.11
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i n g 1.18 0.11
1+ i x
~* 1.06 0.01
1+ i m
~* 1.06 0.01
1+ i n
~* 1.06 0.01
Table IV.9
Group 2
Expected Return Standard Deviation
qx 0.72 0.43
qm 1.36 0.41
qn 1.48 0.50
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i x g 0.63 0.32
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i n g 0.63 0.32
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i x g 0.63 0.32
1+ i x
~* 1.07 0.01
1+ i m
~* 1.07 0.01
1+ i n
~* 1.07 0.01
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Table IV.10
Group 3
Expected Return Standard Deviation
qx 0.88 0.97
qm 2.09 1.81
qn 1.79 1.56
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i x g 0.36 0.49
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i m g 0.36 0.49
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i n g 0.36 0.49
1+ i x
~* 0.73 0.63
1+ i m
~* 0.73 0.63
1+ i n
~* 0.73 0.63
Table IV.11
Group 4
Expected Return Standard Deviation
qx 0.95 0.84
qm 1.54 1.49
qn 1.26 1.34
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i x g 0.42 0.69
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i m g 0.42 0.69
(
~
)( )1 1 1+ + -i n g 0.42 0.69
1+ i x
~* 0.72 0.62
1+ i m
~* 0.72 0.62
1+ i n
~* 0.72 0.62
Group 1 being our benchmark, returns are the same as for
greenfield investments.
Investing in existing assets has an impact on the relative
profitability ranking of the investments: the high expected return on
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equity in the export sector for greenfield investments in Group 2 was
linked to the assumed high initial productivity level. With lower
initial levels of productivity in the export sector of Group 2,
investments in the import-competing and non-traded sectors become
relatively more profitable. For Group 2, returns on loans are the
same as for greenfield investments.
Investing in equities in Groups 3 and 4 by purchasing pre-
existing assets becomes much more profitable and also much riskier
than in the case of greenfield investments.
Optimal Portfolios of Existing Assets
We again consider portfolios consisting of risky investments only.
Mean-variance efficient frontiers of portfolios of investments across
sectors and across countries have been computed taking into account
all the institutional constraints.  The assets considered are again
foreign currency loans and equities.  The results for the mean-
variance efficient frontier of portfolios are as follows:
Table IV.12
Mean-Variance Efficient Portfolios of Investments in Existing Assets
Mean
returns
Standard
deviation
% equity Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
1.075 0.000 55.30 66.28 26.69 3.83 3.20
1.10 0.000 58.54 62.82 30.47 2.72 3.99
1.125 0.000 66.65 61.94 31.28 1.97 4.81
1.15 0.000 73.88 64.63 29.26 1.62 4.48
1.20 0.007 100.00 71.22 24.01 0.00 4.77
1.25 0.031 100.00 82.53 17.47 0.00 0.00
1.30 0.080 100.00 78.12 21.88 0.00 0.00
1.35 0.128 100.00 73.71 26.29 0.00 0.00
1.40 0.175 100.00 0.00 84.97 0.00 15.03
1.45 0.220 100.00 0.00 85.20 0.00 14.80
1.50 0.282 100.00 0.00 82.39 1.79 15.83
1.55 0.402 100.00 0.00 72.62 9.79 17.58
1.60 0.522 100.00 0.00 62.86 17.80 19.34
1.70 0.761 100.00 0.00 43.33 33.82 22.85
1.80 1.001 100.00 0.00 23.81 49.83 26.36
1.90 1.241 100.00 0.00 4.28 65.85 29.87
2.00 1.509 100.00 0.00 0.00 83.57 16.43
2.09 1.810 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
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The basic results of risk diversification across countries (and
across sectors, although this information does not appear in this
table) are as follows.  As with greenfield investments, the share of
equity in the optimal portfolio increases with the expected return
and with risk.  For the lowest expected returns (between 7.5% and
20% roughly), it is optimal to invest mainly in loans and equities of
Groups 1 and 2 with some minor diversification in Groups 3 and 4.
When the expected rate of return exceeds 20% (and is below 35%),
it becomes optimal to invest only in equities and primarily in Group
1 but also in Group 2.  For expected returns above 35% but below
50%, it is optimal to invest mainly in equity in Group 2 and, to some
extent, in Group 4.  For expected returns between 50% and 90%, a
mixed portfolio of Groups 2, 4 and 3 is optimal, with the importance
of equity investments in Group 3 increasing.  For the highest
expected returns and riskiest investments it is optimal to invest in
equities in Groups 3 and 4 only and then, for the highest possible
risk, in Group 3 only.  We note that, as in the case of greenfield
investments, investments in Groups 3 and 4 are dominated for a
broad range of expected returns, although they do kick in
significantly for the very highest expected returns.
The specific numerical inputs and outputs of this sub-section
are to be viewed as illustrative only.  The data we used are highly
unreliable; we had to make a number of heroic simplifying
assumptions to get estimates of some of the variables we needed to
apply our approach; and we could perform historical simulations
only for a far too restricted number of periods.  Nevertheless the
framework we use seems to be useful to link the microeconomic
performance of firms to their macroeconomic environment and can
be expected to give very interesting results when more and better
data become available.  We also believe that the simulations support
the view that the fundamental tools of portfolio theory are
applicable to the problem of optimal investment in transition
economies.
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C. The Implications
First, the simulations confirm that the influence of the macro
economic environment on the performance of projects can be
dramatic.  Kaufmann (1991) reaches the same conclusion.  Table
IV.13 summarises his review of a sample of over 1,300 projects
financed by the World Bank and IFC over the last half century.
Table IV.13
Economic Returns of Work Bank and IFC Projects Under Different
Macroeconomic Distortions
(Rates of return in per cent)
Policy distortion index All projects Public projects Private projects
Fiscal deficit 1
High (8% or more) 13.4 13.7 10.7
Low (less than 4%) 17.8 18.1 14.3
Trade restrictiveness
High 13.2 13.6 9.5
Low 19.0 19.3 17.1
Foreign exchange premium
High (200% or more) 8.2 7.2 *
Low (less than 20%) 17.7 18.0 15.2
Real interest rate
Negative 15.0 15.4 11.0
Positive 17.3 17.5 15.6
* Insufficient number of observations (less than 10) to make inferences.
1  Percentage of GDP
Source: World Development Report, The World Bank (1991), page 82.
Data originate in Kaufmann (1991).
Second, the view that macroeconomic stability has a powerful
effect on enterprise performance is further corroborated by the fact
that the countries in transition that have managed to achieve a more
stable macroeconomy have also been able to attract larger flows of
FDI.  Chart IV.1 illustrates this positive correlation by plotting the
cumulative FDI per capita by country, during 1989—94, against the
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ratio of the average return over the standard deviation for each
country’s portfolio24.
Chart IV.1
Foreign Direct Investment Versus Country Project Performance
y = 0.3887x + 2.5921
R2 = 0.6226
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Finally, the huge dispersion of the returns on projects in
countries of early transition clearly constrains their bankability
through debt instruments.  In fact, debt becomes close to equity
without the upside potential25.  By contrast, country equity-
portfolios across sectors and, furthermore, equity-portfolios across
sectors and countries diversify risks efficiently.  The implication may
well be that in the early stages of transition the emphasis should be
placed on the development of the capital market — through the
building-up of efficient stock exchanges and related markets for and
sources of longer-term risk capital — while banks specialise in
enhancing the economy’s payments system and in short-term
working capital lending.  Only when countries have progressed in
their transitions beyond a threshold of macroeconomic stability and
structural reform does long-term bank financing of enterprises seem
to make sense.
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V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTS
OF THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ON
INVESTMENT AND GROWTH
A. Evidence From Aggregate Data for the Economies in
Transition
In the 25 countries of operations of the EBRD in 1995, there has
been a clear relationship between economic performance at the
aggregate level and macroeconomic control.  As Table V.1
illustrates, those countries which have shown the strongest
commitment to reform are also the ones which have simultaneously
reduced inflation faster, suffered the smallest GDP and fiscal revenue
falls, and witnessed an earlier resumption of growth.  The respective
medians of all the indicators for each of the three groups of countries
depict consistently the better performance of the faster reformers.
For example, the median contraction of GDP at the trough for the
advanced reformers is about one-quarter whereas that for the early
transition countries is about one-half.  The same striking result
applies to annual inflation, 21 per cent versus 1000 per cent,
respectively, in 1994.
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INSERT LANDSCAPE VERSION OF TABLE V.1 HERE
Table V.1
PROGRESS IN TRANSITION AND MACROECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
(measured by the median of each group)
Private Score on Score Score Government Cumulative Decline Annual Ratio of GDP Increase
Sector enterprise on on Fiscal balance (1989-93) in Inflation lowest growth in infant
GDP share restructuring markets' Banking in 1994 Fiscal Revenues Rate registered GDP % mortality
% & privatisation liberaisation Reform % of GDP % of GDP % to 1989 GDP 1994 rate %
a/ a/ a/ a/ d/ b/ 1992 1994 b/ a/ c/
Advanced transition countries 55 3.5 3.5 3 -2 -5 93 21 76 3 -15
Intermediate transition countries 35 2.5 3.5 2 -7 -20 237 62 65 -7 7
Early transition countries 20 1.5 1.5 1 -9 -18 1364 1000 49 -23 15.6
a/ Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(1994), p.18.  The qualitative index of reform in columns 2 to 7 ranges
from 1 to 4.  A western European country would qualify with an index of
5.
b/ Source: De Melo, Demizer and Gelb (1995).
c/ Source: UNICEF (1994), p.6.
d/ It excludes the Central Bank quasi-fiscal deficits.
Note: The groups include:
i) Advanced Transition (Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia).
ii) Intermediate Transition (Albania, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia,
Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Russian Federation).
iii) Early Transition (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan,
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan).
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In a recent study, De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1995) calculate
the profiles followed on average by inflation and real growth in
countries in transition during the years prior to a reform
breakthrough and during the years following that breakthrough.
Their results are summarised in Charts V.1 and V.2.  Radical
reformers suffer an initial fall in real income of about 13 per cent
and a jump in inflation to 14 per cent per month during the year
following the ‘big bang’; nevertheless, they are able to: (i) resume
positive growth four years later; and (ii) control inflation to just
below 3 per cent per month during the fifth year.  The typical
pattern of recovery is one of rapidly expanding private sector activity
outweighing the contraction in public enterprise output.  A parallel
structural change occurs in the sectoral composition of GDP, with
the service sector increasing its share of GDP by 10 percentage
points and with industry — particularly heavy industry — witnessing
a similar drop of its GDP share.  By contrast, the countries that
postpone reform, although able in the beginning to limit real income
losses and to maintain low “official” inflation (typically with the
help of price controls), end up in hyperinflation (average rates of
inflation of 23 per cent per month) and deep depression (average
yearly income losses of about 10 per cent).  The countries,
particularly those in the FSU, which have seen the greatest economic
and social traumas — like increases in age specific mortality rates —
are also the ones where macroeconomic control has been lost.
Chart V.1
Prototype Path of Monthly Inflation in Transition Economies
Before and After Reform Breakthrough
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Chart V.2
Prototype Path of Annual Real GDP Growth in Transition Economies
Before and After Reform Breakthrougha
Path after reform breakthrough
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
0 1 2 3 4 5
Years after reform breakthrough
A
nn
ua
l G
D
P
 G
ro
w
th
Breakthrough
Path before reform breakthrough
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
5 4 3 2 1 0
Years before reform breakthrough
A
nn
ua
l G
D
P
 G
ro
w
th
Breakthrough
Source: De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1995).
a/ Data for 25 countries of operation of EBRD, plus Mongolia.
Results come from an statistical method known as “switching
regime regression”.  The breakthrough is defined as the year in
which a specific country has reached a set of transition indicators ]
omparable to those of Poland as of 1990.
Clearly, in assessing these data the different initial political,
social, cultural and economic conditions should not be neglected.
The countries of the FSU embarked on transition two years later
than the CEEC.  Furthermore, the diaspora of the former Soviet
Republics — the economies of which were tightly integrated and
complementary — was a far more traumatic shock than that of the
dissolution of the CMEA for the CEEC.  Moreover, the latter
countries had been functioning market economies until the 1940s,
some of them even buoyant performers.26  In contrast, the Russian
economy at the time of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was a
predominately pre-capitalist, agricultural economy.
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B. Global Evidence on the Relation Between Inflation, 
Investment and Growth
Low or moderate inflation and limited macroeconomic distortions
have indeed been characteristics of fast-growing economies across
the world, not merely in the transition economies.  Conversely,
economies with a poorer growth record have also experienced higher
inflation and stronger distortions.  Table V.2 bears this out.
Table V.2
Some Economic Characteristics of Fast and Slow Growers (1960—1989)
Averages of:
Fast
Growers
Slow
Growers
t-statistic a
Inflation rate 12% 31% 1.7
Black market exchange rate
premium
14% 57% 3.8
Investment/GDP 23% 17% 5.2
Export/GDP 32% 23% 2.3
Source: Levine and Renelt (1992), Table 2.  Sample of 109 countries; fast
growers are the 56 countries whose growth rate of per capita income
exceeds the mean; slow growers are the remaining 53 countries.
Nevertheless, the evidence on the relationship between
macroeconomic stability and growth should be interpreted with care.
The possibility of two-way causation — and of common third factors
causing both — cannot be ruled out, especially at low and moderate
rates of inflation.  When monthly inflation rates get into double
digits there can be little doubt, however, that macroeconomic
malfeasance depresses growth and seriously harms allocative
efficiency.  Referring to the experience of a group of very high
inflation, middle income countries, Bruno states:
The fact that growth is systematically higher after a sharp stabilisation
is consistent  with  the  finding  that  very  high  rates  of inflation are
definitely harmful to growth.  Stabilisation by itself, even before
sustainable resumption of investment and long-run growth, improves
resource allocation and total factor productivity. (Bruno, 1993.)
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On the other hand, at lower rates of inflation (say 15 per cent a
year or lower) there is less evidence of any clear pattern of
covariation between inflation and growth or between inflation and
other observable indices of efficiency, such as total factor
productivity.  Much of the relevant evidence is surveyed, discussed
and extended in Fischer (1993).  These conclusions are confirmed in
a recent paper by Robert Barro (Barro (1995)), which finds that the
empirical evidence from more than 100 countries over a period of 30
years suggests that the adverse effect of inflation on growth is clear
only when inflation is high: the estimated coefficient of growth on
inflation is statistically significant (albeit small 27) when inflation
averages more than 15 per cent per year.  The estimated coefficient
of growth on inflation is not statistically significant when inflation
averages less than 15 per cent per annum.  Thus, in speaking of the
damaging effects of inflation on performance, one must be clear that
it is the high rates of inflation that are at issue.
A third study, by Pindyck and Solimano (1993)  arrives at the
result that the volatility of the return on capital has a depressing
effect on investment and that this effect is greater for developing
countries than for industrial economies.  Further, it finds that —
after trying a range of indices of political and economic instability as
explanatory variables — only inflation seems to be clearly and
robustly correlated with the volatility of the return on investments.
Consequently, these econometric studies corroborate the more
casual empirical evidence presented in Table.V.2.
Recently, Easterly (1996) has presented evidence that supports
the view that stabilisations starting from very high initial rates of
inflation may actually be expansionary, even in the short run.
Output losses are associated with the earlier stage of loss of
macroeconomic control when the country’s inflation rate explodes.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
A.  Speed of Transition
A great deal has been debated over the relative merits of radical
versus gradualist reforms.  Favouring the former, Balcerowicz (1993,
1994) has argued that with the arrival of newly elected governments
there is a period of ‘extraordinary politics’.  Using that period for
gradual policies is a bad investment for they are susceptible to be
partly reversed, at best, or derailed, at worst, as ‘extraordinary
politics’ turns into ‘normal politics’.  By contrast others, Aghion and
Blanchard (1994) for example, have defended the transitory
maintenance of a core of well-designed subsidies (i.e.  employment
subsidies to selected firms).  Their line of argument is that because
the necessary reallocation of resources is costly — a ‘big-bang’ will
send too many firms into bankruptcy and workers into
unemployment.  This, in turn, will erode the tax revenue base and
put pressure on safety-net public, leading to higher budget deficits
and inflation than would have been the case with intelligently
designed gradualist policies.
Indeed, the debate is far from concluded.  However, as noted
above, the evidence with transition so far — particularly in the
CEEC — appears to be that radical reformers have been more
successful on both the inflation and GDP fronts than the other
reformers.  A central element in the explanation of this reality is the
synergy between micro and macro reforms.  Furthermore, the
simulations of the returns on the three stylised projects discussed in
Section IV support the view that faster macroeconomic reforms mean
improved enterprise performance.
B.  Synergy Between Macrostabilisation and Market
Development
Not only does macroeconomic stability boost enterprise and project
performance, it also spurs the development and proper functioning
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of the key markets in the economy.  As regards the markets for
goods and foreign exchange; a single illustration helps to make a
general point: an exchange rate determined in a foreign exchange
market with a freely floating exchange rate can be termed a ‘market
rate’, but when the central bank provides public enterprises with
subsidised loans to bid for hard currency, this ‘market rate’ can
hardly be viewed as indicative of the social scarcity-value of hard
currency.
Managers of enterprises can gain a marketable reputation by
turning loss-making firms into profitable ones.  High inflation and
volatile relative prices, however, increase the ratio of noise to signal
in the system and, as shown in Section IV, capriciously distort
enterprises’ cash flows.  This blurs the relationship between good
management and enterprise performance (after all, bad results can be
due to noisy prices and good results to luck!) and enhances the
incentives for self-serving pay-offs.28
Both the insider (i.e. Russia) and outsider (i.e. Czech Republic)
privatisation models led to some initial degree of insider control.
Insofar as soft loans and selective subsidies are perpetuated, workers
and management have the option of maximising rents — by
decapitalising the firm and/or lobbying for subsidies — rather than
selling their equity to outsiders.  This tendency is reinforced when
the enterprise — rather than the state — provides workers with a
whole set of social services as in the FSU.  The outcome is a vicious
circle.  The state cannot afford to take over the safety net because its
meagre tax revenues are wasted on subsidies and workers resist
selling their equity stakes because, with the divestiture, they would
lose access to social services and forsake rents.  The result is labour
market immobility.
The market price of the firm equals the present value of its
future cash flows.  When stabilisation and economic reform have
advanced beyond a threshold the average cash-flows of viable firms
improves and the uncertainty surrounding them goes down.
Investors become willing and able to pay more for the firms’ equity.
By contrast, under half-speed reform programmes there is always an
array of possible different stabilisation-liberalisation paths.29 Each
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path implies a different — and not easily predictable — path for the
cash-flow of the firm.30 This uncertainty prompts investors to
discount the value of equity.  In sum, the persistence of subsidies —
coexisting with and causing inflation — lifts the reservation price of
the shares held by the insiders and reduces the willingness to pay for
them by the outsiders.  The development of a capital market is
thereby hampered.
Although survey results for Poland 1990—1993 indicate that
the restructuring of state enterprises was successfully initiated by
public sector managers,31 it is also broadly agreed that in-depth
restructuring of enterprises needs effective corporate governance and
that the latter is best carried out by private outsiders.32  As argued
above, half-hearted reforms obstruct the take-over of enterprises by
outsiders, thus slowing the restructuring process.
C. Establishing the Institutions for Macroeconomic Stability
A key role of the government is to provide the ‘public intermediate
good’ of macroeconomic stability.  The policies conducive to a
stable macroeconomy can only be designed and administered
through suitable institutions.  The economies in transition, having
inherited the ‘wrong’ institutions, need to develop those tailored to a
market economy, including the institutions required to perform inter
alia the following key tasks.
Enforcing Hard Budget Constraints
Enforcing hard budget constraints is the first rule of a market
economy.  Without it, liberalising markets, freeing prices and
privatising state enterprises is pointless.  A hierarchy of hard budget
constraints can be visualised.  The Government/Central Bank should
impose a hard budget constraint on the banking sector, thereby
prompting commercial banks to enforce hard budget constraints on
their borrowers.  Indeed, governments throughout the world are
attempting to impose harder budget constraints on themselves by
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establishing independent central banks and through constitutional
amendments on their ability to borrow, spend and tax.33
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Managing Monetary Targets and/or the Exchange Rate
This can be done through a conventional central bank or through a
currency board.  A currency board issues domestic currency only in
exchange for convertible currencies at a fixed exchange rate.  The
whole monetary base is fully-backed by international reserves and is
demand driven.  Small, very open economies and those prone to
fiscal irresponsibility may be advised to go for a currency board.
Hong Kong in Asia, Panama and Argentina in Latin America, and
more recently Estonia and Lithuania in eastern Europe, have been
successful at stabilising inflation with the help of currency boards.
One downside of currency boards is that the arrangement precludes
the role of lender of last resort in the event of a systemic banking
crisis, like the one recently experienced by Latvia with the collapse
of the main commercial bank.  Whatever the regime, credibility is
key: unless a particular institutional arrangement is adopted lastingly
and in substance it is unlikely to survive.  Independence of the
central bank is not strictly necessary but there is evidence that
independence helps deliver macroeconomic stability.34
Banking Supervision
The supervision and regulation of the financial sector should be a
top priority.  High real interest rates and changing profitability across
enterprises and sectors — both inherent to transition — can, in the
absence of strong banking supervision, easily lead to non-performing
portfolios.  A big portion of the “bad loans” will eventually be
absorbed by the state.
Tax Administration
The ability to levy taxes on a broad base, allowing both acceptable
marginal rates and revenue levels, is key to the state discharging its
obligations effectively and without recourse to the inflation tax.  As
noted above, for economies in transition the challenge is formidable.
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Supplying the Social Safety Net
Shifting the burden of providing the safety net traditionally supplied
by state enterprises to the general government constitutes another
major fiscal challenge.  The government need not supply directly the
services it finances.  A part can be contracted out to the private
sector or the “civil society”/not-for-profit sector.  Transition also
raises the issue of intergenerational equity.  The older generations
have shorter time horizons and their opportunity to accumulate
wealth bypasses them in favour of skilled and dynamic younger
workers and entrepreneurs able to earn high incomes in the private
sector.  Transition thus enhances the role of the state in effecting
intergenerational incomes transfers in a cost-effective way.
The case that loss of macroeconomic control undermines
economic performance is surely powerful.  Belittling the importance
of macroeconomic constraints, as one finds implicitly or explicitly in
arguments for some ‘vital’ expenditure, does disservice to both
welfare and to the quality of argument.  Macroeconomic control is,
par excellence, central to the role of the state in promoting
transition to a market economy.
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ENDNOTES
1. A good or service is non-rival if its use by one agent does not
affect its availability to other agents (that is, if the marginal cost of
making it available to additional agents is zero).
2. A good or service is non-excludable if it is prohibitively costly
to restrict access to it.
3. The former Czechoslovakia already had a tradition of fiscal
conservatism while others, like the former Yugoslavia, had
experienced high inflation for over a decade, and yet others like the
countries of the FSU and Bulgaria showed pervasive repressed
inflation — manifested in shortages and an acute monetary
overhang.  On the external debt front most countries of the region,
with the exceptions of Bulgaria, FYR of Macedonia, Hungary,
Poland and Russia, started their transitions virtually free from
foreign debt.  Of the heavily indebted countries only Hungary
continued to honour its external debt commitments.
4. See Coase (1937).
5. A (global) systemic failure like the Great Depression is an
obvious exception, although even there, government action or
inaction at the very least aggravated the situation.
6. The state in this context encompasses the central and local
governments, the central bank, and the public enterprises.
7. Note that this happened in an advanced transition country such
as Hungary which has a banking code guided by Basle-like adequacy
ratios and better bank oversight standards than most other transition
countries.  Of course, the American Saving and Loan crisis reminds
us that large-scale financial shambles are by no means confined to
developing countries and transition economies.
54
8. The grant could be contingent, with full servicing of the debt
only waived under specified uncertain circumstances.  Option pricing
methods would have to be used to value such contingent claims on
the government.
9. For a more detailed explanation of the concept of the ERT, see
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1993),
pp.50—51.
10. The country simulations are based on a successful private
sector project co-financed by the EBRD in Hungary.  The
calculations were performed by means of a variant of the soft-ware
“Measuring Effective Taxation of Enterprise” (Dunn and Pellecchio
(1990)).  The information on the specific conventions to calculate
tax returns in each country was obtained from the booklet “Taxation
in eastern Europe, 1995” (Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu International
(1995)).  These conventions include: whether historical cost or
replacement cost accounting is used to cost-out input inventories
and depreciation allowances; whether interest on debt is deductible
from taxable profits; whether or not distributed dividends are subject
to taxation; whether losses can be carried over and for how many
years.
11. ‘Shoe leather’ refers to frequent trips to the bank so that as
little money as possible needs to be held in one’s pocket; ‘menu
costs’ refers to the frequent relabelling of prices in restaurants, shops
etc.
12. Real depreciation of the currency means a decrease of the
relative price of non-traded goods to traded goods.
13. See Pindyck and Solimano (1993).
14. Cumulative FDI per capita to Ukraine during 1989—94 was
only US$ 9 versus an average of US$ 44 for the region and a
maximum of US$ 671 for Hungary.
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15. Assume that annual inflation is running at 100 per cent and
wages are fully adjusted for past inflation every twelve months.  If
the indexation period were halved to every six months, the inflation
rate would have to increase sufficiently to prevent average monthly
real wages from rising sharply. See Pazos (1990).
16. The term ‘insurance’ is hardly descriptive. A worker gets paid a
contingent benefit (contingent on being unemployed). There is no
experience rating for individual workers and only in some countries
(like the USA) is there (partial) experience rating for individual
firms.  Even in the aggregate, there is no necessary (actuarial) link
between total contributions (by workers and employers) and total
unemployment benefits.
17. Compulsory unemployment insurance can mitigate the adverse
selection problem; it does nothing to reduce the moral hazard
problem.
18. See Cardoso (1992), Kane and Morisett (1993) and Cardoso et
al (1995).
19. See Corden (1990).
20. x denotes exports, m denotes import-competing and n denotes
non-traded.
21. Strictly speaking, with limited liability the rate of return to
equity in sector j is max {0, qj}.  Our simulations allow for this, but
we omitted it in the text to avoid unnecessary clutter.
22. ‘Default’ on equity simply means that the net rate of return is
negative, or the gross rate of return qi is less than 1.
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23. The Lankes-Venables (1996) survey shows that the proportion
of greenfield investments in their group I (Czech Rep., Hungary)
38% whereas it is only 32% in their group II and 30% in their group
III, which corroborates our results (their groups have been ranked
using transition indicators).
24. The means and variances of country return used in Chart IV.1
are from a different (albeit similar in spirit) simulation study than the
one considered in Sections IV.A and B.  The simulations underlying
Chart IV.1 consider only two sectors per country (a traded and a
non-traded sector) but include a larger number of countries.  Unlike
the simulations of Sections IV.A and B, those generating Chart IV.1
include a direct, inflation tax-like adverse effect of inflation on
enterprise performance.  For details see Buiter and Lago (1996).
Note that a proper measure of risk would not be based on the
variance, but rather on the covariance of country returns with the
returns available elsewhere.
25. The interest rate on loans would have to be priced at high
levels, which can cause financial distress for otherwise creditworthy
borrowers.
26. The income per capita of Czechoslovakia at the time was only
about one-third lower than that of France. In these countries the
generational memory of the market is still there
27. A 10 percentage points higher average annual inflation rate
between 1960 and 1990 was associated with a 0.2 to 0.3 percentage
point lower average annual growth rate of real GDP over the same
period.
28. This argument also favours the use of tax-based income
policies (like the Polish PPWW) so as to prevent the decapitalisation
of enterprises.
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29. To put it trivially, the price of electricity may be brought in line
with, say, cost recovery levels, in one month, one year, two years, or
never.
30. Of course there is always the theoretical possibility of a highly
credible, coherently designed and consistently implemented gradual
programme. However, there are not many successful historical
experiences of the kind.
31. Pinto and Van Wijnbergen (1994).
32. Frydman, Grey and Rapaczynski (1996).
33. A recent extreme example of the sort is New Zealand’s Fiscal
Responsibility Act.
34. It seems that it is de facto, rather than de jure independence
that matters (see Cukierman (1992) and Bruno (1994)).
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ENDNOTES
                                                
1 A good or service is non-rival if its use by one agent does not
affect its availability to other agents (that is, if the marginal cost of
making it available to additional agents is zero).
2 A good or service is non-excludable if it is prohibitively costly
to restrict access to it.
3 The former Czechoslovakia already had a tradition of fiscal
conservatism while others like the former Yugoslavia had
experienced high inflation for over a decade and yet others like the
countries of the FSU and Bulgaria showed pervasive repressed
inflation - manifested in shortages and an acute monetary overhang.
On the external debt front, most countries of the region - with the
exceptions of Bulgaria, FYR of Macedonia, Hungary, Poland and
Russia - started their transitions virtually free from foreign debt.  Of
the heavily indebted countries only Hungary continued to honour its
external debt commitments.
4 See Coase (1937).
5 A (global) systemic failure like the Great Depression is an
obvious exception, although even there, government action or
inaction at the very least aggravated the situation.
6 The state in this context encompasses the central and local
governments, the central bank, and the public enterprises.
7 Note that this happened in an advanced transition country like
Hungary, which has a banking code guided by Basle - like adequacy
ratios and better bank oversight standards than most other transition
countries.  Of course, the American Saving and Loan crisis reminds
us that large-scale financial shambles are by no means confined to
developing countries and transition economies.
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8 The grant could be contingent, with full servicing of the debt
only waved under specified uncertain circumstances.  Option pricing
methods would have to be used to value such contingent claims on
the government.
9 For a more detailed explanation of the concept of the ERT, see
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1993), pp.50-
51.
10 The country simulations are based on a successful private
sector project co-financed by the EBRD in Hungary.  The
calculations were performed by means of a variant of the soft-ware
“Measuring Effective Taxation of Enterprise” (Dunn and Pellecchio
(1990)).  The information on the specific conventions to calculate
tax returns in each country was obtained from the booklet “Taxation
in eastern Europe, 1995” (Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu International
(1995)).  These conventions include: whether historical cost or
replacement cost accounting is used to cost-out input inventories
and depreciation allowances; whether interest on debt is deductible
from taxable profits; whether or not distributed dividends are subject
to taxation; whether losses can be carried over and for how many
years.
11 “Shoe leather” refers to frequent trips to the bank so that as
little money as possible needs to be held in one’s pocket; “menu
costs” refers to the frequent relabelling of prices in restaurants,
shops etc.
12 Real depreciation of the currency means a decrease of the
relative price of non-traded goods to traded goods.
13 See Pindyck and Solimano (1993).
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14 Cumulative FDI per capita to Ukraine during 1989-94 was
only US$ 9 versus an average of US$ 44 for the region and a
maximum of US$ 671 for Hungary.
15 Assume that annual inflation is running at 100 per cent and
wages are fully adjusted for past inflation every twelve months.  If
the indexation period were halved to every six months, the inflation
rate would have to increase sufficiently to prevent average monthly
real wages from rising sharply. See Pazos (1990).
16 The term “insurance” is hardly descriptive. A worker gets paid
a contingent benefit (contingent on being unemployed). There is no
experience rating for individual workers and only in some countries
(like the USA) is there (partial) experience rating for individual
firms.  Even in the aggregate, there is no necessary (actuarial) link
between total contributions (by workers and employers) and total
unemployment benefits.
17 Compulsory unemployment insurance can mitigate the adverse
selection problem; it does nothing to reduce the moral hazard
problem.
18 See Cardoso (1992), Kane and Morisett (1993) and Cardoso et
al (1995).
19 See Corden (1990).
20 x denotes exports, m denotes import-competing and n denotes
non-traded.
21 Strictly speaking, with limited liability, the rate of return to
equity in sector j is max {0, qj}.  Our simulations allow for this, but
we omitted it in the text to avoid unnecessary clutter.
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22 “Default” on equity simply means that the net rate of return is
negative, or the gross rate of return qi is less than 1.
23 The Lankes-Venables (1996) survey shows that the proportion
of greenfield investments in their group I (Czech Rep., Hungary)
38% whereas it is only 32% in their group II and 30% in their group
III, which corroborates our results (their groups have been ranked
using transition indicators).
24 The means and variances of country return used in Chart IV.1
are from a different (albeit similar in spirit) simulation study than the
one considered in Sections IV.A and B.  The simulations underlying
Chart IV.1 consider only two sectors per country (a traded and a
non-traded sector) but include a larger number of countries.  Unlike
the simulations of Sections IV.A and B, those generating Chart IV.1
include a direct, inflation tax-like adverse effect of inflation on
enterprise performance.  For details see Buiter and Lago (1996).
Note that a proper measure of risk would not be based on the
variance, but rather on the covariance of country returns with the
returns available elsewhere.
25 The interest rate on loans would have to be priced at high
levels, which can cause financial distress for otherwise creditworthy
borrowers.
26 The income per capita of Czechoslovakia at the time was only
about one-third lower than that of France. In these countries the
generational memory of the market is still there
27 A 10 percentage points higher average annual inflation rate
between 1960 and 1990 was associated with a 0.2 to 0.3 percentage
point lower average annual growth rate of real GDP over the same
period.
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28 This argument also favours the use of tax-based income
policies (like the Polish PPWW) so as to prevent the decapitalisation
of enterprises.
29 To put it trivially, the price of electricity may be brought in line
with, say, cost recovery levels, in one month, one year, two years, or
never.
30 Of course there is always the theoretical possibility of a highly
credible, coherently designed and consistently implemented gradual
programme. However, successful historical experiences of the kind
are not many.
31 Pinto and Van Wijnbergen (1994).
32 Frydman, Grey and Rapaczynski (1996).
33 A recent extreme example of the sort is New Zealand’s Fiscal
Responsibility Act.
34 It seems that it is de facto, rather than de jure independence
that matters (see Cukierman (1992) and Bruno (1994)).
